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Introduction |
 Nestled along the eastern bank of the Dniestr River is a region of
Europe known as Transdniestria. It is located in the Republic of
Moldova, but it is not controlled by the government in Chisinau. The
region is run by a group of former factory directors and Supreme Soviet
deputies who declared the area independent in 1991 when they set up the
"Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic (TMR)." A civil war ensued that ended
in a cease-fire imposed by the Russian Army, which remains encamped
there despite several Russian commitments to leave. No country
recognizes the independence of the TMR, but Russia, and to a lesser
extent, Ukraine, provides a measure of succor to its leaders. Continued
allegations of human rights violations, smuggling of contraband,
including drugs and armaments, and the trafficking of human beings, have
escalated tensions to the level that Transdniestria represents a major
destabilizing factor on the border of the European Union and NATO.
Strengthening Moldova as a viable European nation and eliminating the
chaos on the periphery of the expanding EU is an international concern.
Recognizing that the road to peace in Moldova runs through Moscow
requires an international commitment to reassure Russia that its best
interests lie in a unified Moldovan state. |
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History: Past & Present |
The
Republic of Moldova occupies most of what was once known as Bessarabia.
It is a part of the once independent Moldovan state that emerged briefly
in the 15th century under Stefan the Great, but subsequently fell under
Ottoman rule in the 16th century. After the Russo-Turkish War of
1806-12, Bessarabia was ceded to Russia, while Romanian Moldova (west of
the Prut River) remained in Turkish hands. Romania, which gained its
independence in 1878, obtained control of the Russian half of Moldova in
1918 after a plebiscite pursuant to the Wilsonian principles of
self-determination. The Soviet Union never recognized the annexation and
created an autonomous Moldavian republic on the east side of the Dniestr
River in 1924. In 1940, the U.S.S.R., annexed Bessarabia under terms of
the notorious Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. Unlike the Baltic States, who
were also victims of the same pact, the Western debt to Moldova in this
regard has never been acknowledged.
In the summer of 1991, the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic broke
away from the Soviet Union and declared itself to be the independent
Republic of Moldova. A group of Russian speakers led by Igor Smirnov, a
factory manager who came to Moldova in November 1987 to become a
director of the Elektromash factory in Tiraspol, created the TMR,
ostensibly to protect the Russian minority in Transdniestria from the
possible reunification of Moldova with Romania. Local militias were
formed, and public buildings were seized from the Moldovan authorities.
A civil war ensued and several thousand people died in clashes before a
cease-fire was proclaimed and negotiations begun, enforced by the
presence of the 14th Soviet Army.
The purported fear of a Moldovan union with Romania that led to the
bloodshed was never a real possibility. Reunification was neither
economically feasible for either Romania or Moldova, nor politically
acceptable to their neighbors. Reunification did not even enjoy the
support of a majority of the Moldovan population. Simply put, Romania
could not play the role of West Germany, financing the transformation
and modernization of Moldova. Romania was itself one of the poorest
states in Europe and was just starting off on its own journey towards a
market economy. Moldova's economy was still tied to the Commonwealth of
Independent States and dependent on CIS energy imports. Romania was in
no position to replace those imports; in fact, Romania was
import-dependent too. By joining Romania, Moldova would have risked
losing its CIS markets. Moreover, the historical record of Romanian rule
gave Moldovans pause. When Bucharest took power in Moldova after World
War I, it sharply curtailed local sovereignty. Romania also imposed
excessive taxes that contributed to economic stagnation. And, as
Moldovans vividly recalled, carpetbaggers had rushed in to take
government positions at the expense of local job seekers. Why would a
Greater Romania have been any better for Moldova than the past one?
Indeed, in a referendum on reunification held in 1994, with a decisive
75% of the Moldovan electorate participating, 95% said yes to
independence thereby indirectly saying no to union with Romania.
During its thirteen years of independence, Moldova became the poorest
nation in Europe; a weak state producing illegal immigrants as its main
export and source of revenue. Approximately 80% of its people live below
the poverty line. Twenty-five percent of its labor force, out of a total
of 2 million workers, have jobs outside the borders of Moldova. Yet,
although much of Moldova's industrial assets are in the hands of the TMR,
the 650,000 people who live under its control are even worse off
economically than their neighbors across the Dniestr River.
 The Russian army never left Transdniestria. Although it committed to
withdraw its troops, and a vast store of armaments and munitions, by
December 31, 2003, both at the 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit and at the 2002
OSCE Ministerial Meeting in Porto, the Russians have remained on
Moldovan territory. In fact, the TMR's survival is based, in large part,
upon the flow of energy from Russia -- energy for which the TMR pays
nothing. Instead, the Russians bill the government in Chisinau for the
energy they deliver to Transdniestria for free, and then pressure the
Republic of Moldova to pay the bill. Moldova owes $1.3 billion for
energy imports -- in an economy with a $1.7 billion annual GDP -- $460
per capita. Of this amount, $960 million is the TMR's debt to Russia's
Gazprom -- a figure more than three times the GDP of the TMR. The
Russians say that they are ready to leave, but that the TMR authorities
are blocking the removal of their men and the vast munitions storehouse.
This is currently true, but hardly convincing. If pressed, the Russians
will tell you that they cannot leave because they must remain in
Transdniestria to protect their citizens -- but protect them from whom?
There are more Russians living in Moldova than inside the TMR, and they
are in no need of protection from anyone.
Tensions continue to simmer in a myriad of daily conflicts. A
mobilization of every Transdniestrian male between 18 and 45 for 90 days
service in the Transdniestrian army has begun, fueled by TMR news
reports claiming that armed conflict with Moldova is near.
Observers believe that vested political and illicit economic interests
in Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova have too much at stake in maintaining
the status quo to allow for a legitimate solution. Cigarette and drug
smuggling, and the trafficking of human beings are just a part of the
purported activities underway in Transdniestria. Part of the former
Soviet defense industry that manufactures everything from small arms to
mortars and small rockets, are humming away in Transdniestria for buyers
whose identity is not exactly a mystery. |
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The TMR State |
 Over
the last fourteen years, the TMR has turned from a phantom state propped
up by the Russian Federation into a functioning political unit with
armed forces larger than those of Moldova, and issuing its own passports
and its own currency, albeit unrecognized by any other nation in the
world. The TMR organizes elections, collects the garbage, has courts for
civil disputes and criminal trials, employs various ministries who toil
away at various functions, and it has educated an entire generation of
children who believe that their country is the TMR, not the Republic of
Moldova. Time has thus allowed the importance of a national identity to
grow in the minds of the inhabitants of Transdniestria. And it is not as
if life in Moldova is so grand or so very different than life in the TMR
so as to entice the people of Transdniestria to long for union with
Moldova.
The status quo has allowed the TMR to have a de facto country; it has
permitted corrupt Ukrainian and Moldovan officials to maintain a
profitable channel for imports and exports; and it has allowed Russia to
hold onto a foothold in the Balkans. Indeed, Moldova cannot escape its
own complicity in allowing the situation to stagnate – although it ought
to be said that President Voronin has done more to attempt to end this
dispute than past leaders. Here’s an example of the sort of Moldovan
complicity that makes the status quo too beneficial for some to alter.
According to Professor Charles King, although the TMR contains
approximately 17% percent of Moldova’s total population, in 1998,
Moldovan customs officials registered an import figure for the region
that was four times as large as that for the rest of Moldova – and for
cigarettes it was 6,000 times as large. All those goods were imported
with the full knowledge of Moldova’s customs officials since the goods
were registered as coming into Moldova for end-use in the TMR. As
Professor King noted in testimony before the US Helsinki Commission,
“This means one of two things: either corrupt officials on the Moldovan
side benefit by diverting these allegedly Dniester imports onto the
general Moldovan market, or the Dniester problem will resolve itself
when the entire population contracts lung cancer from smoking too many
cigarettes.” |
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Is There an Ethnic Conflict? |
Moldova’s
main ethnic group are Romanians. The Soviets labeled them "Moldovan,"
and asserted that they were not ethnically Romanian. Moscow also called
the Romanian language "Moldovan," and underscored this by outlawing the
use of the Latin alphabet and requiring the use of Cyrillic letters.
Then the Soviets fabricated historical justifications for these measures
when, in truth, they were designed to bolster Soviet claims to the
territory. Sadly, much of this foolishness was carried over by the
Moldovan government that had the Romanian language constitutionally
declared to be "Moldovan."
This Soviet vestige has been taken to an extreme by the TMR that, in
August, closed a Romanian language boarding school in the town of
Bendery because it was using the Latin script and not the Cyrillic
alphabet. TMR militiamen left orphans and children from disadvantaged
families who lived in the school stranded without water, gas or
electricity, and efforts to bring them food and water were initially
refused by the militia, even to UNICEF relief workers. The authorities
in Bucharest condemned the move, blaming officials in the TMR for
"stoking a policy of ethnic and linguistic cleansing." The European
Union issued a statement calling for the school to be reopened. Four
other Romanian language schools had been closed down in the region prior
to this closing for the same reasons, and despite protests from the OSCE.
The Russian Federation finally intervened to end this crisis
demonstrating rather persuasively the extent of its influence over the
TMR.
But is there an actual ethnic conflict in Moldova or are these political
manifestations from the TMR authorities in Tiraspol? What seems beyond
peradventure is the fact that in the rest of Moldova, the Romanian
majority and the Russian, Ukrainian and Gagauz (Turkish) minorities are
well integrated into Moldovan society, business and government. They
routinely intermarry and, to all observers, they appear to get along
just fine. Moreover, Chisinau's liberal policies on minority schooling,
publishing and cultural expression have been internationally commended.
The "conflict" appears to be more about greed and power than ethnic
differences. If true, then there is no justification for the creation of
a virtually independent autonomous region in Transdniestria simply to
satisfy some regional oligarchs. Indeed, no democratic state should
foster the creation of regional enclaves for the benefit of smugglers
and arms merchants. So what is actually going on here? |
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Russia's Interests |
Transdniestria
clearly has some geo-political significance to the Russian Federation.
Maybe it represents a post-Cold War ambition to retain control over the
former Soviet Republics or to gain a foothold in the Balkans, but to
what end? The foot-dragging and endless negotiations over thirteen years
have made Russia appear weak, muddled, and unreliable to its Western
partners. At a time when Russia and the West have so many shared
security concerns, why would Russia persist in maintaining the
nightmarish situation on the banks of the Dniestr?
Russia's military intervention in Moldova began in June 1992 when it
entered the civil war on the TMR's side. This resulted in the deployment
of a Russian-led "peacekeeping operation" which has effectively frozen
the status quo into de facto TMR independence. Russian material,
logistical, administrative and training support helped establish the
TMR's armed forces during 1991-99 and, until late 2001, Russian officers
trained the TMR armed forces. In July 1992, the Moscow Agreement between
Russia and Moldova enshrined Russia as mediator and excluded Romania
from the settlement process. In October 1994, a Russian-Moldovan
agreement guaranteed that the 14th Army would leave Transdniestria
within three years, but the Duma never ratified it. In February 1995,
Mr. Smirnov issued a decree forbidding the withdrawal of the Russian
Army's property from the TMR. Nevertheless, between 1992 and 1999,
primarily due to budgetary constraints, the Russians decreased their
troops in the TMR from 9,250 to 2,600, and destroyed a significant
amount of munitions. Other armaments were shipped out of the TMR by the
Russians at the expense of the OSCE and over the objections of Mr.
Smirnov. But nearly 20,887 metric tons of ammunition plus ten train
loads of military equipment remain in Transdniestria.
On May 8th, 1997, Moldova’s then President, Petru Lucinschi, and the
separatist leader of the TMR, Mr. Igor Smirnov, after the mediation of
the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the OSCE Mission in the Republic of
Moldova, signed a Memorandum on normalization of the relations between
the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria. In the accord, the TMR
promised to establish a "common state" with Moldova, although that term
was not defined. It has since led to very different interpretations by
the parties. In November 1999, at the OSCE summit in Istanbul, President
Yeltsin agreed that all arms and equipment would be withdrawn or
destroyed by the end of 2001, and all Russian troops would withdraw by
the end of 2002. In June 2000, President Putin formed a special
commission under the chairmanship of Russian Foreign Minister Evgeny
Primakov. His plan that sought to turn Moldova into a loose
confederation that would have given the TMR extensive influence over
Moldovan government policy, and guaranteed a continuing Russian
influence, actually increasing Russia’s military presence in Moldova.
This plan failed because it was one-sided and lacked international
support.
 In February 2003, President Vladimir Voronin established a Joint
Constitutional Commission to draft a federal constitution for Moldova.
By mid-year, President Voronin requested Russian mediation with the TMR
to jump start the Commission. President Putin appointed his deputy,
Dmitry Kozak, to consult with the Moldovans and the TMR and prepare a
proposal. TMR intransigence resulted in a five-sided format (Moldova,
TMR, Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE) but that also stalled. Eventually,
the Russians secured some measure of agreement on a plan dubbed the "Kozak
Plan" without involvement of the five-sided group. The Kozak Plan views
a “common state” of Moldova and Transdniestria much like two people
living under a common roof, but not in the same apartment as a unified
couple. Among a series of debilitating elements, Russia was to maintain
2,000 troops in Moldova until 2020. The memorandum was due to be signed
on November 25, 2003 in President Putin's presence, but that morning,
President Voronin telephoned Mr. Putin to cancel the ceremony. This was
the result of the significant support that Moldova received from the
OSCE, the EU and the US that each believed that the Kozak Plan would
have formalized the status quo and endangered the possibility of Moldova
ever becoming a viable European state. On April 26, 2004, the five-sided
negotiations began again, but they have since fizzled. Moreover, Moscow
has not met its December 2003 deadline for the withdrawal of its troops
and munitions. President Voronin has proposed a Security and Stability
Pact for Moldova to be signed by Russia, Ukraine, Romania, the EU and
the US, but the Russian Foreign Ministry notes that the problem can only
be settled on the basis of a “. . . coordinated and reliably guaranteed
status of the Dniester Region . . . following the compromise solutions
that were achieved earlier with Russian assistance.” In other words, the
Russians are still insisting upon the discredited Kozak plan. The EU and
the US are both pushing for an international peacekeeping operation
under OSCE supervision, to which the Russians object. NATO member states
refuse to sign the Adapted CFE Treaty until Russia withdraws its troops
and armaments from Moldova and Georgia.
It seems that there really is no single Russian policy toward Moldova.
There are at least two, both of which are at odds with each other.
Presidents Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin have consistently assured
international organizations that they are committed to removing Russian
troops from Moldova, but the Defense Ministry and individual military
commanders often state that the army is the guarantor against the
“ethnic cleansing” of Moldova’s Russian minority – who, it should again
be pointed out, mostly live outside the TMR. Russia's approach to
Moldova is baffling. It is almost ludicrous. Russia's security hardly
depends on two thousand troops in Moldova. By dragging its feet on
Transdniestria, Russia has put into question the viability of its
pronouncements on security and cooperation with NATO, the OSCE and the
EU. Its behavior has further damaged its already poor reputation among
the people of the region, and only fosters the criminality that rages
throughout the entire area. While having some historical basis, Russian
instance upon an autonomous status for the TMR does not appear to be in
the interests of anyone other than the oligarchs of Transdniestria.
Isn’t Russia better served by having stable, prosperous, and democratic
states on its borders rather than unstable, dirt poor, countries propped
up by a web of corrupt business networks? |
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Conclusion |
 The
Transdniestrian crisis that has seared Moldova for nearly fourteen years
does not appear to be grounded in ethnic tensions. Transdniestria seems
instead to be nothing more than a geographic area that was reinvented
into a political unit to serve the economic interests of a few regional
oligarchs. While the military realities on the ground have added impetus
and strength to the call for an autonomous Transdniestria, they have not
legitimized it. This means that the international community needs to
look seriously at new proposals for expanding and reinvigorating the
negotiation format, and make Transdniestria a much higher priority.
Moldova has a strong commitment to Europe, but it must demonstrate an
even stronger recommitment to democratic and economic reform in order to
make itself a more appealing partner for the EU to realize its accession
aspirations. To help bring this about, the EU should immediately open a
delegation office in Chisinau.
The resolution of the Transdniestrian situation lies in clarifying and
addressing Russia’s concerns in the region -- which seem to be murky
even to the Russians. Within the reasonable parameters of those
concerns, as well as those of Ukraine and the inhabitants of
Transdniestria and Moldova, a European solution must be forged and
guaranteed. This will require Russia to fulfill its Istanbul commitments
and withdraw its troops and munitions from the territory of the Republic
of Moldova. The peoples of the region should no longer be victimized by
the fallout of history. The international community must resolutely work
to end the downward economic spiral of the people of Moldova – but, in
the end, this is the obligation of history that mainly falls to Russia
to resolve. |
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Copyright 2005 Rubin Meyer Doru & Trandafir, societate civila de avocati.
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